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Administrative Exhaustion and Class
Actions: Rules, Rights, Requirements,
Remedies, and The Prison Litigation
Reform Act Issue Resolved
Elizabeth S. Hess'
The doctrine of administrative exhaustion requires that an
individual exhaust all available administrative remedies before
he or she may be entitled to judicial relief.' Class actions pose a
unique circumstance in which, pursuant to the requirements ar-
ticulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"), the
exhaustion doctrine must translate to a class of individuals with
the same complaint or complaints. Courts must take into consid-
eration many issues when determining the exhaustion require-
ments for a prospective class. For example, what are the congres-
sionally mandated statutory requirements for administrative ex-
haustion? Must all members of the class individually exhaust
their respective administrative remedies? How might the pur-
poses of the exhaustion doctrine be preserved when deciding
whether or not to require class-wide exhaustion? How will either
the requirement that remedies be exhausted or the waiver of ex-
haustion requirements affect the rights of individual class mem-
bers?
Statutory administrative exhaustion requirements and their
subsequent effect on class actions have raised difficult interpre-
tive issues in agency regulation and judicial adjudication in the
United States for decades.2 The doctrine of administrative ex-
haustion originates in common law3 and subsequently has been
codified by Congress in various statutes, notably the Social Secu-
* A.B. 2001, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 2004, University of
Chicago.
' See Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons From
Environmental Cases, 53 Geo Wash L Rev 1, 3 (1985).
2 See generally id.
William Funk, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: New Dimensions Since
Darby, 18 Pace Envir L Rev 1, 1 (2000).
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rity Act,4 the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"),5 and the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA").6 Class actions arising under
the Social Security Act and Title VII present different studies in
how courts interpret administrative exhaustion requirements. In
some cases, courts have interpreted these requirements to be un-
waiveable under certain circumstances.7 In certain Title VII
cases, it has been held that class-wide exhaustion is unneces-
sary.8 However, the exhaustion requirement for class actions
brought under the PLRA has not yet been fully addressed and
answered. The question still remains: does the PLRA's adminis-
trative exhaustion provision require that all members of a PLRA
class action exhaust all individual administrative remedies before
pursuing their claims collectively in federal court, or is it suffi-
cient that only the representative plaintiff has done so?
This Comment argues that courts addressing the issue of
administrative exhaustion in a class action brought under the
PLRA must determine that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement
does not mandate class-wide exhaustion. To make this determi-
nation, courts may use statutory interpretation techniques, in-
voking certain canons of construction to evaluate whether the
PLRA demands that each and every class member exhaust his or
her administrative remedies before pursing legal action. Alterna-
tively, a court may use traditional judicial tools to analyze factors
such as the purpose of class actions and the interaction of the
class action mechanism with the administrative exhaustion re-
quirement. 9 The best approach to resolving the question sur-
rounding the PLRA's exhaustion requirement as applied in the
42 USC § 405(g) (2000).
42 USC § 2000e-5 (2000).
42 USC § 1997e (2000).
See, for example, Marcus v Sullivan, 926 F2d 604, 613 (7th Cir 1991) (discussing
Johnson v Sullivan, 922 F2d 346 (7th Cir 1990)) ("[Flailure of disability claimants to
challenge an illegal procedure of the Secretary within the administrative process cannot
be excused when those claimants have allowed the deadline for bringing an administrative
appeal to lapse before the class action commenced.").
8 See, for example, Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 414 n 8 (1975) (holding
that backpay may be awarded on a class basis under Title VII without exhaustion of
administrative procedures by the unnamed class members).
' See, for example, Romasanta v United Air Lines, Inc, 717 F2d 1140, 1157-58 (7th
Cir 1983) (holding that class members in the present case need not all have exhausted
administrative remedies because there was no danger of rewarding plaintiffs who have
"slept on their rights," which is one purpose of the administrative exhaustion
requirement).
[2003:
7731 CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
class action context, however, is to analogize to similar statutes.'
By applying the rationale behind the waiver of administrative
exhaustion requirements as codified in other statutes such as the
Social Security Act and, most notably, Title VII, a court should
find that class-wide exhaustion is not required under the PLRA.
Part I of this Comment will articulate the doctrine, its ori-
gins, and the policies and principles behind the concept of admin-
istrative exhaustion. Part II will discuss how courts have applied
the doctrine in the context of class actions brought under both the
Social Security Act and Title VII. Part III will analyze the unset-
tled issue regarding the exhaustion requirement and class actions
under the PLRA and will argue that the PLRA does not require
that all class members exhaust their individual administrative
remedies before bringing a class action.
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
The PLRA, like other statutes," contains an administrative
exhaustion requirement. 2 How a court applies such a require-
ment in both the individual and class contexts depends on what a
court perceives as the underlying purpose of the doctrine.
A. The Administrative Exhaustion Requirement Articulated
The doctrine of administrative exhaustion requires an indi-
vidual to pursue non-judicial remedies prior to seeking judicial
review of agency action. 13 This doctrine is one in a group of closely
related doctrines-including abstention, finality, and ripeness-
that govern the timing and availability of judicial review.1 4 The
Supreme Court has demonstrated its respect for agency auton-
,o See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory
Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 Vand L Rev 647, 649 (1992) (suggesting
reasoning by analogy to similar statutes as an alternative basis upon which judges can
interpret statutes).
" See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
12 See 42 USC § 1997e.
, See McKart v United States, 395 US 185, 204-05 (1969) (White concurring).
McCarthy v Madigan, 503 US 140, 144 (1992). The judicial doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is distinct from the doctrine of finality. See 2 Fed Proc, L Ed
§ 2:330 (2002) (noting that the doctrine of finality addresses whether the initial decision-
maker has arrived at a definite, or final position on the issue, while the administrative
exhaustion doctrine's requirement refers to administrative and judicial procedures by
which an injured party may seek review of a decision and seek remedy). The
administrative exhaustion doctrine's requirement refers to administra-tive and judicial
procedures by which an injured party may seek review of a decision and seek remedy. Id.
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omy and its unwillingness to prematurely interfere with an
agency's decision-making process. In McKart v United States,
1 5
the Court indicated that the rationale underlying exhaustion is to
respect agency autonomy and to avoid premature intervention,1
6
saying that "[t]he administrative agency is created as a separate
entity and invested with certain powers and duties." 7 As such,
"[tihe courts ordinarily should not interfere with an agency until
it has completed its action, or else has clearly exceeded its juris-
diction."8
The Court, however, also noted that because of the doctrine's
breadth, it may be subject to certain exceptions. 9 Specifically, in
McCarthy v Madigan,2° the Court stated that "[aidministrative
remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's interests in imme-
diate judicial review outweigh the government's interests in the
efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doc-
trine is designed to further."2' If an individual's immediate access
to the courts outweighs the importance of having an agency first
evaluate that individual's claims, the exhaustion of administra-
tive review may not be required.22
B. Origins in Common Law Translate to Modern Application
The doctrine of administrative exhaustion finds its origins in
common law federal equity jurisdiction, a source of judicial re-
view of federal agency action.2 The doctrine is regarded as analo-
gous to the general equity rule dictating that equity provides re-
lief only when a plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law. 2' This
common law requirement is presently reflected in Section 704 of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),2m which allows review
395 US 185 (1969).
6 Id at 193-94.
, Id at 194.
6 Id.
'9 McKart, 395 US at 193 ("The doctrine is applied in a number of different situations
and is, like most judicial doctrines, subject to numerous exceptions.").
20 503 US 140 (1992).
21 Id at 146, citing West v Bergland, 611 F2d 710, 715 (8th Cir 1979). Although
McCarthy involved administrative exhaustion before it was statutorily mandated by the
PLRA, but the court's analysis is still applicable to this Comment's discussion.
2 Id.
' See Funk, 18 Pace Envir L Rev at 1 (cited in note 3).
24 Id.
2' 5 USC § 704 (2000)
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only after final agency action "for which there is no other ade-
quate remedy in a court."2
The common law concept of federal equity jurisdiction has
been translated to modern notions of an agency's delegated deci-
sionmaking authority and purpose, in addition to concepts of
agency responsibility. 27 The doctrine of administrative exhaustion
is grounded in the idea that, because Congress has delegated de-
cisionmaking authority to an agency, that agency-and not the
courts-must have the primary responsibility of reviewing appli-
cable claims.2 Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that
"[w]here Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required
... [blut where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion,
sound judicial discretion governs. "2 Therefore, when lacking a
clear congressional mandate, courts must begin an administra-
tive exhaustion analysis with a "strong presumption that Con-
gress intends judicial review of administrative action.""
C. Purposes of Administrative Exhaustion
The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine underscores the func-
tion of judicial review of agency decisions. The Supreme Court
has articulated a two-fold purpose behind the administrative ex-
haustion requirement. 3' First, the Court has held that agencies,
not courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs
that Congress has charged them to administer.32 The second un-
derlying purpose of the exhaustion doctrine, as recognized by the
Supreme Court, is judicial efficiency.3 In deciding whether ad-
ministrative exhaustion is required in any given case, a court
must take the two main purposes of the administrative exhaus-
tion requirement into account.34
A court applying the exhaustion doctrine should be mindful
of agency autonomy.3 Consequently, when considering the appli-
' Id. See also Funk, 18 Pace Envir L Rev at 1 (cited in note 3).
Funk, 18 Pace Envir L Rev at 2 (cited in note 3).
See McCarthy, 503 US at 145.
Id at 144. See also Darby v Cisneros, 509 US 137, 144-45 (1993) (holding that the
imposition of an administrative exhaustion requirement is dependent on congressional
intent).
Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US 667, 670 (1986).
31 See McCarthy, 503 US at 145.
32 Id.
Id.
Id.
" See Robert C. Power, Help Is Sometimes Close at Hand: The Exhaustion Problem
and the Ripeness Solution, 1987 U Ill L Rev 547, 554-55 (1987) (discussing the Supreme
777
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cation of the administrative exhaustion doctrine courts should
adhere to several principles that promote this autonomy. First,
the agency must be able to function efficiently and have an oppor-
tunity to correct its own errors.3 This position is based on a
"commonsense notion of dispute resolution that an agency ought
to have an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to
the programs it administers before it is hauled into federal
court."37 Second, the court and the parties will benefit from
agency expertise and experience when the agency's processes are
not threatened with interruption." Third, allowing the agency to
proceed without the threat of premature interruption permits the
agency to compile an adequate record for judicial review. 39
In addition to the furtherance of agency interests, judicial
interests are also advanced by the doctrine of administrative ex-
haustion. Adherence to the doctrine aids judicial review and pro-
motes judicial economy by creating a division of labor between
the judiciary and administrative agencies.' In McKart, the Su-
preme Court noted that an agency, like a trial court, is created for
the purpose of applying a statute in the first instance when a
complaint or claim is made.41 Allowing an agency to first follow its
own review procedures when a claim is filed also allows for the
development of a factual record. 42 The Court stated that "it is
normally desirable to let the agency develop the necessary factual
background upon which decisions should be based."4 Addition-
ally, an agency's expertise could lead to better outcomes and fur-
ther aid judicial review." Finally, efficiency interests support the
Court's adherence to the doctrine of administrative exhaustion.
In McKart the Supreme Court held that it is "generally more effi-
cient for the administrative process to go forward without inter-
Court's recognition that administrative agencies are autonomous bodies, and the
implications for administrative exhaustion).
3 See id at 554.
'7 McCarthy, 503 US at 145.
See 2 Fed Pro at § 2:330 (cited in note 14).
See id.
40 Power, 1987 U Ill L Rev at 554-56 (cited in note 35).
395 US at 193-94.
Id at 194.
43 Id.
41 Id (holding that "since agency decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature or
frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that
discretion or to apply that expertise").
[2003:778
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ruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts
at various intermediate stages. "4
D. Administrative Exhaustion Encompasses a Balancing Test
Although the doctrine of administrative exhaustion is firmly
rooted in American common law and is additionally codified in
the APA and other specific statutes, the doctrine is still subject to
judicial discretion.4 Thus, the Supreme Court has articulated a
balancing test a court should use to determine whether exhaus-
tion is required. In McCarthy,47 the Court held that "[i]n deter-
mining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts must bal-
ance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a
federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional inter-
ests favoring exhaustion."' The institutional interests are,
namely, retaining agency responsibility and autonomy and pro-
moting judicial efficiency.49
Because the institutional interests must be balanced with the
individual interests, courts must consider how the application of
an administrative exhaustion requirement affects an individual
claimant. 5° The Supreme Court has noted three major reasons
why the interests of an individual may weigh heavily against re-
quiring exhaustion. 5' First, requiring exhaustion may unduly
prejudice an individual's subsequent assertion of the claim in a
court action.52 Second, if exhaustion is required, an individual's
administrative remedy "may be inadequate 'because of some
doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to grant effective
relief.'" Third, the Court noted that "an administrative remedy
may be inadequate where the administrative body is shown to be
biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it."'
These concerns over an individual's ability to be free from preju-
McKart, 395 US at 194.
46 McCarthy, 503 US at 144.
47 503 US 140 (1992).
48 Id at 146.
'9 Id at 145.
See id at 146 (noting that application of balancing requires close attention to the
particular claim presented).
"I See McCarthy, 503 US at 146-49.
1 See id at 146-47 ("Such prejudice may result, for example, from an unreasonable or
indefinite timeframe for administrative action.").
Id, quoting Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564, 575 n 14 (1973).
Id at 148, quoting Gibson, 411 US at 575 (holding that exhaustion is not required
where an Attorney General statement indicated that seeking administrative relief would
be futile).
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dice in an agency's decision, as well as the adequacies of the
agency's remedy, must be considered in addition to the institu-
tional concerns regarding administrative autonomy and judicial
efficiency.
II. APPLICATIONS IN THE CLASS ACTION CONTEXT
Administrative exhaustion requirements are frequently codi-
fied as individual requirements, as in the PLRA.5 The individual
requirement must be translated by courts into the class action
context. In the class action context, courts must interpret these
individual requirements to determine whether all individuals in
a class must exhaust their individual administrative avenues be-
fore being able to proceed as members of a class. In making this
determination, a court must consider the underlying purposes of
the class action mechanism, in addition to the possible conse-
quences of limiting the class action device.5
A. A Clash Between Administrative Exhaustion and
Class Actions
Administrative exhaustion requirements in the class action
context are potentially in tension with the fundamental purposes
underlying Rule 23 and the class action mechanism. The class
action rule addresses four basic concerns: (1) it provides for effi-
cient adjudication of issues that would otherwise require multiple
adjudication; (2) it provides for judicial access in instances where
individual cases would not or could not be brought; (3) it provides
an opportunity for consistent adjudication; and (4) it reflects due
process concerns through the adequacy of representation re-
quirement. 7 Administrative exhaustion requirements translated
into the class action context have the effect of potentially limiting
class actions.8 An exhaustion requirement mandating that all
members of a prospective plaintiff class exhaust their individual
administrative remedies prior to pursuing class action litigation
See 42 USC § 1997e.
See Nancy Morawetz, Underinclusive Class Actions, 71 NYU L Rev 402, 423-24
(1996) (describing four basic purposes of the class action).
17 Id. See also Morgan v Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern California, 81
FRD 669, 679 (N D Cal 1979) (stating that the requirement of adequate representation
ensures due process rights of absent class members).
' See generally, Morawetz, 71 NYU L Rev at 403 (cited in note 56) (discussing the
effects of limitations on class size).
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burdens the prospective class and likely will have a diminishing
effect on the size of the class.59
The consequences of limiting class actions impact the pur-
poses underlying Rule 23.60 Limiting the size of a class impacts
the rights of both those who are included and those who are not
included.6' A decision to limit the size of a class action because all
of its members have not fulfilled the administrative exhaustion
requirement is a decision to deny redress to persons who might
have been included in the plaintiff class.62 Thus, the principal
harm in narrowly defining a class is the potential of denying
similarly situated persons the same opportunity for relief for
similar claims.63
1. Consistency and due process concerns.
In addition to the harm resulting when relief is denied to po-
tential class members due to a narrow definition of the class,
other harms impact the core purposes underlying the class action
mechanism, such as consistent judicial adjudication and due
64process concerns. Limiting the size of a class action also raises
questions regarding judicial inefficiencies because of the potential
for multiple individual legal actions concerning the same or simi-
lar issues, instead of one single, coordinated action. 65 Further-
more, disparities can result from different choices about how
classes are defined or interpreted. If a single, unified action may
not be brought, numerous adjudications of the same issue by dif-
ferent courts may produce conflicting results.66
2. Judicial efficiency concerns.
Judicial efficiency is an essential consideration in determin-
ing how exhaustion requirements translate to the class action
context. This concern is particularly relevant in the context of
administrative exhaustion because an underlying purpose of the
doctrine is to achieve increased judicial efficiency.67 Concerns re-
" Id at 420-26.
6o Id at 423-24.
6" Id at 403.
62 See Morawetz, 71 NYU L Rev at 403 (cited in note 56).
63 Id at 420.
Id at 424.
65 Id.
"' See Morawetz, 71 NYU L Rev at 425 (cited in note 56).
17 Id at 424.
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garding judicial inefficiencies arise when a narrow class defini-
tion will lead to subsequent litigation that will likely involve
claims that could have or should have been part of the original
case.6" Should a court decide that exhaustion is required of all
class members, the class itself will certainly shrink to include
only those members who have already exhausted their respective
administrative remedies. Alternatively, the class may dissolve
completely if most of the prospective plaintiffs have not pursued
their respective avenues of administrative exhaustion. The result
of mandatory class-wide exhaustion would be that the class ac-
tion would proceed on a much smaller scale, or would not proceed
at all, and the likelihood of future litigation regarding the same
issues would increase. 9 Those individuals who were unable to
seek redress from the court via the class action mechanism might
then proceed through the channels of administrative exhaustion
and return to court at a later time, most likely as individual
plaintiffs. ° Depending on the number of individuals that return
to court after exhausting their administrative remedies, courts
could be awash in potentially duplicative litigation.
.3. Equal protection concerns.
Another potential harm arising from the reduction of class
size due to the administrative exhaustion requirement being ap-
plied in the class action context involves the issue of equal protec-
tion."1 Under Rule 23, the consequences of a narrow class defini-
tion merit increased judicial attention because the decision re-
garding who should and should not be included in the class is
tantamount to a court-sanctioned determination of who should be
treated equally.72 The Supreme Court has recognized this danger
and held that in some circumstances, the interest of an individual
in obtaining immediate review may weigh against requiring ex-
haustion.73 If individual interests are not considered, all prospec-
tive class members may have similar claims, but only some of
those individuals-namely those included in the class-will have
their claims adjudicated.74 Those who are excluded from class
68 Id.
"' Id at 425.
70 See Morawetz, 71 NYU L Rev at 426 (cited in note 56).
71 Id.
71 Id at 425-26.
" McCarthy v Madigan, 503 US 140, 146 (1992).
74 See Morawetz, 71 NYU L Rev at 425 (cited in note 56).
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membership will have to bring separate suits in order to have
their claims heard.
B. Whether to Require Class-Wide Administrative Exhaustion
Usually, exhaustion by one named representative of a class is
sufficient to meet the exhaustion requirement. 75 The D.C. Circuit
has held that "[tihe doctrine requiring exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies applies to class actions as well as individual actions
.... It is generally agreed that exhaustion by at least one member
of the class is a necessary prerequisite for a class action."76 De-
spite this generalization, courts have struggled to apply the ad-
ministrative exhaustion requirement in numerous class actions
brought under various statutes, such as the Social Security Act,
Title VII, and the PLRA. These statutes all contain exhaustion
requirements articulated for an individual, but are silent as to
the requirements for exhaustion in the context of class actions.77
Courts frequently have interpreted administrative exhaustion
requirements codified in statutes such as the Social Security Act
and Title VII as not requiring class-wide administrative exhaus-
tion.78 By analogy, the rationale behind the waiver of the exhaus-
tion requirement in Title VII and the Social Security Act contexts
applies to an analysis of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.
C. The Social Security Act
Lawsuits brought under the Social Security Act have ad-
dressed the issue of translating individual administrative ex-
haustion requirements into the class action context. 79 Courts have
articulated the requisite individual exhaustion requirement and
71 See, for example, Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 414 n 8 (1975) (holding
that if a named class member has exhausted administrative remedies, exhaustion is not
required for other class members).
71 Phillips v Klassen, 502 F2d 362, 369 (DC Cir 1974) (emphasis added). See also
Barela v United Nuclear Corp, 462 F2d 149, 153 (10th Cir 1972) (holding that once a basic
complaint has been administratively processed, a class action can be maintained); Oatis v
Crown Zellerbach Corp, 398 F2d 496, 499 (5th Cir 1968) (holding that it is not necessary
that class members bring an administrative charge as a prerequisite to joining as co-
plaintiffs but that it is sufficient that they are in a class and assert the same or some of
the same issues).
7 See 42 USC § 405(g); 42 USC § 2000e-5; 42 USC § 1997e.
See, for example, Albemarle, 422 US at 414 n 8 (holding that unnamed class
members in a Title VII case need not have filed charges with the EEOC); Califano v
Yamasaki, 442 US 682, 699-700 (1997) (holding that there is no clear congressional intent
to limit class relief under the Social Security Act).
71 See, for example, Marcus v Sullivan, 926 F2d 604, 613 (7th Cir 1991).
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have also indicated that discretion should be exercised when ad-
dressing the issue of class relief.'
1. The judicial treatment and review of administrative
decisions under the Social Security Act.
Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows for judicial
review of Social Security Administration decisions provided the
claim first receives a "final" decision from the administrative
agency. 8' The Supreme Court held that, for the administrative
decision to be considered "final," the claimant must fulfill two
requirements.2 The first requirement is strictly nonwaiveable
and calls for a claimant to first present a claim for benefits to the
Social Security Administration.8 The second requirement dictates
that a claimant exhaust all administrative remedies before bring-
ing his or her claim in federal district court.8 The Court explicitly
found this second requirement was waiveable."
The Supreme Court has held that the traditional rationales
and policies underlying the doctrine of administrative exhaustion
are applicable in cases arising under the Social Security Act. 8
The Court noted that congressional intent behind agency delega-
tion should be respected; hence, the "doctrine of administrative
exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the particular
administrative scheme at issue."87 The Court also held that
agency autonomy and efficiency should be taken into considera-
tion when applying the doctrine, noting:
[e]xhaustion is generally required as a matter of prevent-
ing premature interference with agency processes, so that
the agency may function efficiently and so that it may
have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the
parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and ex-
pertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judi-
cial review.8
See Califano, 442 US at 698-700.
42 USC § 405(g).
See Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 328 (1976).
Id.
Id.
8 Id.
See Weinberger v Salfi, 422 US 749, 765-67 (1975).
87 Id at 765, citing Parisi v Davidson, 405 US 34, 37 (1972).
m Salfi, 422 US at 765.
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Pursuant to the Social Security Act's provisions, courts must
give the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare appropriate deference, allowing him much leeway in de-
termining under what circumstances full exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies will be required.89 The Supreme Court, when
examining the Social Security Act's exhaustion requirement pro-
visions, held that "[t]he term 'final decision' is not only left unde-
fined by the Act, but its meaning is left to the Secretary to flesh
out by regulation."9 The Court subsequently held that "[t]he
statutory scheme is thus one in which the Secretary may specify
such requirements for exhaustion as he deems serve his own in-
terests in effective and efficient administration."9' In deferring to
the agency's administrative judgment to further one of the under-
lying goals of the exhaustion doctrine, namely increased effi-
ciency, the Court concluded that "it would be inconsistent with
the congressional scheme [for a court] to bar the Secretary from
determining in particular cases that full exhaustion of internal
review procedures is not necessary for a decision to be 'final'
within the language of § 405(g)."9 2
The Secretary is entitled to make individual determinations
regarding whether or not the exhaustion requirement need be
fulfilled in each case.93 However, courts also may exercise discre-
tion in determining when sufficient administrative avenues have
been pursued.9" The Supreme Court held that "[o]nce a benefit
applicant has presented his or her claim at a sufficiently high
level of review to satisfy the Secretary's administrative needs,
further exhaustion would not merely be futile for the applicant,
but would also be a commitment of administrative resources un-
supported by any administrative or judicial interest."95 Courts do
not have to require that the claimant exhaust his or her adminis-
trative remedies before seeking judicial review because this sec-
ond prong of the "final decision" requirement is not jurisdictional
and may be waived.9 Thus, the courts have the discretion to de-
See id at 766-67.
Id at 766. See 42 USC § 405(a) (2000) (regarding the Secretary's authority to
promulgate regulations not inconsistent with the Act).
Safi, 422 US at 766.
Id at 766-67.
See id.
Id at 765-66.
9' Salfi, 422 US at 765-67 (noting that this rationale is applicable to show why the
administrative exhaustion requirement may be waived in class action circumstances). See
also Part II B 2.
Eldridge, 424 US at 328.
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termine whether the second element of the "final decision" re-
quirement needs to be met in any given case.'
2. The administrative exhaustion requirement and class
actions under the Social Security Act.
For class actions brought under the Social Security Act,
membership is limited to claimants who have exhausted their
remedies, as well as those who still had an opportunity to do so
when the suit was filed.98 Although administrative exhaustion is
required under the Act to bring an action, the requirement that
all class members fully exhaust their administrative remedies is
waiveable by a court under certain circumstances.9 Waivability of
the exhaustion requirement has the potential to largely impact
the dynamic between the exhaustion requirement and class ac-
tions under the Act.
The Supreme Court has spoken directly to the issue of class
relief and the need for discretion when applying the administra-
tive exhaustion requirement of the Social Security Act.' ° Class
relief is appropriate under some circumstances.10 ' When analyz-
ing the Act's exhaustion requirement provision, the Court noted
that "[s]ection 205(g) [as amended by § 405(g)] contains no ex-
press limitation of class relief ... [and instead] prescribes that
judicial review shall be brought by the usual type of 'civil action'
brought routinely in district court in connection with the array of
civil litigation. 0 2 The Court went on to hold that the language of
the statute may not be construed as limiting the class action
mechanism under the Act. °3 It "[did] not find in § 205(g) the nec-
essary clear expression of congressional intent to exempt actions
brought under that statute from the operation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."' 4
The Seventh Circuit has held that cognizable class actions
brought under the Social Security Act are limited to those class
" See Bowen v City of New York, 476 US 467, 486 (1986) (holding that waiver of
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirements as to those claimants whose time to
pursue further administrative appeals had lapsed, as well as those claimants who still had
time to seek review at time suit was filed was warranted).
98 See Marcus, 926 F2d at 613.
See id.
,o See Califano, 442 US at 699-700.
'o, See id at 701.
,o Id at 699-700.
,0' Id.
00 Califano, 442 US at 700.
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members who have satisfied the first element of the statutory
requirement, that a claim be filed with the Secretary, even if the
claimants have not exhausted all possible administrative reme-
dies.' ° Noting that waiver of the exhaustion requirement is often
preferable, the Seventh Circuit explained that if the traditional
purposes underlying administrative exhaustion-including
agency autonomy, the compilation of an adequate record, and
providing the parties an opportunity to benefit from agency ex-
pertise-are not furthered by requiring class-wide exhaustion,
waiver of the exhaustion requirement is favored.'O
In a pair of decisions regarding class actions filed pursuant to
the Social Security Act, the Seventh Circuit established this
modification of the Act's exhaustion requirement. 17 In Johnson v
Sullivan,'08 the court found that claimants who had already ex-
hausted their administrative remedies and those claimants who
still had an opportunity to do so when the class action was filed
should remain in the'plaintiff class.' °9 In a subsequent class ac-
tion brought under the Social Security Act, Marcus v Sullivan,"°
the Seventh Circuit again upheld waiver of exhaustion for all
class members who had already filed claims with the Secretary
but had not necessarily received a "final decision" on those
claims."' The court in Marcus noted that "[blecause the plaintiff
class in this case includes only claimants with live claims, John-
son dictates that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate for all class
members." 2 These decisions may be construed as having a limit-
ing effect on class membership. However, these holdings also in-
dicate that waiver of the exhaustion requirement is appropriate,
even in instances where the exhaustion requirement is more
broadly construed to encompass all live claims, including the
claims of individuals who have not completely exhausted their
administrative remedies.
1" See Johnson v Sullivan, 922 F2d 346, 355 (7th Cir 1990). See also Marcus, 926 F2d
at 613 (noting that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate for all class members who have not
allowed their appeals period to expire under Johnson).
See Marcus, 926 F2d at 614, citing Salfi, 422 US at 765.
See Johnson, 922 F2d at 346; Marcus, 926 F2d at 604.
.. 922 F2d 346 (7th Cir 1990).
Id at 355.
11 Id.
. See Marcus, 926 F2d at 604.
11' Id at 613.
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D. Title VII
1. Title VII claims and class actions.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, like the Social Security Act,
contains an exhaustion requirement stipulating that individuals
must exhaust their administrative remedies before pursuing legal
action.113 The interaction between the administrative exhaustion
doctrine and class actions arises in suits for claims of employ-
ment discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act."4 Title VII was passed with the intent to promote equality in
the workplace by prohibiting discriminatory employment prac-
tices based upon one's "race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin."" 5 In Kremer v Chemical Construction Corp,"6 the Supreme
Court held that the adjudication of civil rights and other federal
objectives by administrative agencies must be checked by judicial
review. 1 7 In University of Tennessee v Elliott,"5 the Court also
indicated that "Congress did not intend unreviewed state admin-
istrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII
claims."" 9 The Court felt that the goal of prohibiting workplace
discrimination was too important to allow agency decisions to go
unchecked.
2. Title VII class action administrative
exhaustion requirement.
The Supreme Court has held that the exhaustion require-
ment contained in Title VII does not require that all class mem-
bers exhaust their individual administrative remedies before
bringing a class action pursuant to Title VII.12° The Court held
that under Title VII, if a single named class member has ex-
'" 42 USC § 2000e-2 (2000).
... See Albemarle, 422 US at 414 n 8.
.. 42 USC § 2000e-2(a).
,, 456 US 461 (1982). See id at 470 (holding that state court review of administrative
decisions should be given preclusive effect by federal district courts).
117 Id.
"' 478 US 788 (1986).
... Id at 796. An African American employee filed administrative appeal, and during
pendency of administrative appeal, filed complaint in federal court alleging employment
discrimination. After administrative judge had issued order, employee renewed action in
federal court and judgment was entered for university, the court of appeals reversed, and
the Supreme Court held that unreviewed state administrative proceedings did not have
preclusive effect on employee's Title VII discrimination claims. Id.
"0 See Albemarle, 422 US at 414 n 8.
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hausted his or her administrative remedies, then other class
members need not do so to be included in the class, even in cases
involving money damages rather than injunctive relief.121 The
Court went on to explain that the legislative history of the statute
clearly demonstrated that Congress ratified this construction of
the Act in subsequent legislation.
122
The circuit courts have followed the Supreme Court's guid-
ance in applying the administrative exhaustion doctrine to Title
VII class actions. 23 If the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is
not fulfilled by requiring complete administrative exhaustion for
all class members, it would be senseless to require that each and
every class member file an individual claim." Thus, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that "[wihere the two claims are so similar that it can
fairly be said that no conciliatory purpose would be served by fil-
ing separate [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC")] charges, then it would be 'wasteful, if not vain' to re-
quire separate EEOC filings."2 5 The Fifth Circuit has stipulated
that the better approach to the exhaustion requirement in a class
action context "would appear to be that once an aggrieved person
raises a particular issue with the EEOC which he has standing to
raise, he may bring an action for himself and the class of persons
similarly situated."' Accordingly, the court held that "it is not
necessary that members of the class bring a charge with the
EEOC as a prerequisite to joining as co-plaintiffs in the litigation.
It is sufficient that they are in a class and assert the same or
some of the same issues."27
"' See id.
2 Id.
" See, for example, Romasanta v United Air Lines, Inc, 717 F2d 1140, 1157 (7th Cir
1983) ("[It is well established that, in a Title VII class action, unnamed plaintiffs are not
precluded from class membership merely because they did not individually file timely
[Equal Opportunity Employment Commission] charges."); Foster v Gueory, 655 F2d 1319,
1322 (DC Cir 1981) (finding that the critical factor in determining whether an individual
Title VII plaintiff must file an EEOC charge, or may escape the requirement by joining
with another plaintiff who has already filed such a charge, is the similarity of the two
complaints).
12 Foster, 655 F2d at 1322.
2 Id, citing Oatis, 398 F2d at 498.
126 Oatis, 398 F2d at 498.
.27 Id at 499. See also Allen v Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F2d 876, 882
(8th Cir 1977) (holding that Title VII relief could not be denied to thirteen class plaintiffs
who had not pursued administrative remedies); Wheeler v American Home Products Corp,
563 F2d 1233, 1238-39 (5th Cir 1977) (holding that wherever similarly situated persons
intervene in an action and one or more of the original plaintiffs has satisfied the requisite
exhaustion requirement, the class action may proceed).
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This approach is similar to the approach taken in cases
brought under the Social Security Act and Title VII. In class ac-
tions under the Social Security Act, modification of statutory ex-
haustion requirements is often preferable when furthering the
traditional purposes underlying the doctrine. 128 Similarly, the
purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is not fulfilled by requiring
complete class-wide exhaustion in the Title VII context.'2 How-
ever, the standard under Title VII is broader than the standard
under the Social Security Act because Title VII does not require
class members to file an administrative claim.3 ° Because PLRA
claims more closely resemble Title VII claims in that one claim
sufficiently represents the claim of every other similarly situated
individual, class-wide exhaustion should be similarly waived un-
der the PLRA.
III. THE PLRA: THE UNANSWERED QUESTION
The PLRA was signed into law on April 26, 1996.131 The two
goals of the PLRA are to curb frivolous prisoner lawsuits and to
discourage courts from micromanaging prison systems. '32 Various
provisions of the PLRA substantially restrict prisoner litigation,
affecting class action lawsuits challenging conditions of confine-
ment and individual civil actions. 13 Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA
states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correc-
tional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted."134 The exhaustion requirement contained in the
PLRA is similar to the exhaustion requirements in both the So-
cial Security Act and Title VII. Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA has
been interpreted by courts as clearly barring suits by individual
128 See Johnson, 922 F2d at 352-55.
'2 See Foster, 655 F2d at 1322.
130 See Oatis, 398 F2d at 498.
'3, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The reference to the year 1995 in the
title of the PLRA is an error.
132 See Zehner v Trigg, 952 F Supp 1318, 1324 (S D Ind 1997), citing legislative
history.
133 Randall S. Jeffrey, Restricting Prisoners' Equal Access to the Federal Courts: The
Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Substantive Equal
Protection, 49 Buff L Rev 1099, 1099 (2001).
3' 42 USC § 1997e(a) (2000).
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inmates who have not yet exhausted their administrative reme-
dies.13
A. Cases Raising Section 1997(e)(a)'s Exhaustion
Requirement but Decided on Different Grounds
Courts have not yet had occasion to address directly whether
all class members need exhaust their administrative remedies
under the PLRA. Cases that have raised the issue of class actions
under the PLRA and the implication of the exhaustion require-
ment contained in Section 1997e(a) have all been decided on dif-
ferent grounds.1 36 For example, in Jones v Goord,137 the issue of
the PLRA's exhaustion requirement for a class in which every
member failed to exhaust administrative remedies was raised but
the court allowed the original four plaintiffs to amend their com-
plaint under Rule 15 to avoid addressing the issue in the context
of a class action.138
In Handberry v Thompson,139 inmates ages sixteen to twenty
brought an action against New York City for failure to provide
educational services while they were incarcerated in a juvenile
facility."1° The court held that it need not address the issue of ad-
ministrative exhaustion and class certification because "[t]he
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 does not require prospective
plaintiffs to avail themselves of the grievance procedure for is-
sues outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections."4
Because the plaintiffs' class claims for educational services fell
beyond the power of the New York Department of Corrections,
the class action was not affected by the PLRA's exhaustion re-
quirement. 42 The court concluded that "[b]ecause the nature of
relief sought by plaintiffs makes the exhaustion requirement in-
applicable in this case, the court need not address the broader
issue of whether the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to
See, for example, Perez v Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 182 F3d 532, 534-
35 (7th Cir 1999).
"3 See, for example, Jones 'El v Berge, 172 F Supp 2d 1128, 1131 (W D Wis 2001)
(holding that defendants waived affirmative defense that the case must be dismissed until
every class member has exhausted administrative remedies).
'37 2000 US Dist LEXIS 337, *1 (S D Ala).
'3 See id at *4-5 (noting that the original four plaintiffs' claims were filed before the
passage of the PLRA and therefore were not subject to the Act).
92 F Supp 2d 244 (S D NY 2000).
"' Id at 245.
Id at 248.
142 Id.
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bona fide class actions in general."4 Since cases potentially rais-
ing the issue have been decided on other grounds, one might con-
clude there is a hesitancy or unwillingness on the part of the
courts to affirmatively address the issue of administrative ex-
haustion and class actions under the PLRA.
B. Dicta Discussing Section 1997(e)(a)'s
Exhaustion Requirement
Although no court has yet decided the question of whether all
plaintiffs in a class action under the PLRA need satisfy Section
1997e(a)'s administrative remedy exhaustion requirement, sev-
eral courts have discussed the issue in dicta.'" Such discussion
has not resulted in a clear consensus among courts.
In Hawker v Consovoy,'" a New Jersey district court evalu-
ated a proposed settlement to a prisoner class action suit.'46 In
ruling that the settlement agreement was both fair and reason-
able, the court noted that "there is a significant risk that this
class action would be barred by the PLRA because the Named
Plaintiffs and class members may not have sufficiently exhausted
administrative remedies.1 47 This risk created an incentive for theplaintiff class to settle its claims.'"
Although the Hawker court implied that all class members,
or at least all named plaintiffs, must exhaust their administra-
tive remedies before filing a lawsuit, a federal district court in
Wisconsin recently espoused a differing view. In Jones 'El v
Berge,' 9 inmates at a high security prison brought a class action
challenging the conditions of their confinement." ° The court de-
nied the defendants' motion to dismiss because the defendants
had "waived a defense that the case must be dismissed until
every class member has exhausted his administrative remedies
on the claims certified for class action" by failing to raise this is-
sue in their initial response to the plaintiffs' complaint.1
51
... Handberry, 92 F Supp 2d at 248.
144 See, for example, Hawker v Consovoy, 198 FRD 619, 632-33 (D NJ 2001); Jones 'El,
172 F Supp 2d at 1131-33.
198 FRD 619 (D NJ 2001).
Id at 621-22.
,17 Id at 633.
1' Id.
,41 172 F Supp 2d 1128 (W D Wis 2001).
50 Id at 1130.
"' Id at 1131.
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Although the Jones 'El court dismissed the defendants'
claims on other grounds, it discussed in dicta the issue of whether
or not each class member needed to exhaust his administrative
remedies under the PLRA.' 52 The court believed that, because the
overarching objective of the legislation was to afford prison offi-
cials the opportunity to resolve disputes internally and to limitjudicial management of prisons, as long as prison officials have
received a "single complaint addressing each claim in a class ac-
tion," the goal of the PLRA has been accomplished.5 Thus, the
court concluded that "even if defendants had not waived the af-
firmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
as to every member of the class, the exhaustion requirement
would be satisfied by a showing that one or more class members
had exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to each
claim raised by the class.""'
Other courts, also commenting in dicta on the issue of the
PLRA's administrative exhaustion requirement and its effect on
the filing of class action lawsuits, seem to agree with the Jones
'El court. The D.C. Circuit, in Jackson v District of Columbia,
noted the strength of the plaintiffs' argument that each individ-
ual plaintiff in the class need not have pursued available admin-
istrative remedies if at least one member of the class meets the
filing prerequisite.""
C. The Doctrine of Vicarious Exhaustion and the PLRA
The doctrine of vicarious exhaustion holds that "exhaustion
of administrative remedies by one member of the class satisfies
the requirement for all others with sufficiently similar griev-
ances." 157 This doctrine has been espoused in various cases
brought under Title VII.1
5 8
512 Id at 1131-33.
" Jones 'El, 172 F Supp 2d at 1133, citing Smith v Zachary, 255 F3d 446, 449 (7th Cir
2001).
Id at 1133.
254 F3d 262 (DC Cir 2001).
"6 Id at 269, citing Foster v Gueory, 655 F2d 1319, 1321-22 (DC Cir 1981).
Hartman v Duffey, 88 F3d 1232, 1235 (DC Cir 1996).
See, for example, Foster, 655 F2d at 1322-23 ("[T]he EEOC charge filed by one of
the original plaintiffs served the principal functions of the EEOC requirement .... If it
was impossible for the EEOC to effectuate a settlement of the original plaintiffs' claim,
there is no reason to believe that the EEOC would be successful in settling [the other
members'] claims.").
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In cases addressing the issue of the exhaustion requirement
under Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA, courts have indicated that
the doctrine of vicarious exhaustion might be available to plain-
tiffs in a prisoner class action. 9 For example, in Doe v Cook
County,"o a case in which four juveniles housed in a temporary
juvenile detention center sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against certain practices and conditions of the center, an Illinois
district court raised the idea that the doctrine of vicarious ex-
haustion might be viable under the PLRA."' Similarly, in Rahim
v Sheahan, 2 another Illinois district court pointed out that the
vicarious exhaustion doctrine has been applied in the Title VII
context to class claims in which only the named plaintiff satisfied
the statutory administrative exhaustion requirement. 6 3 The court
stated that it saw "no reason why this analysis should not apply
equally to claims under the PLRA."'" An Ohio district court, how-
ever, suggested that "vicarious exhaustion" might be available to
plaintiffs in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action lawsuit,1 65 but will not
satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement for plaintiffs in other
166
cases.
D. Congressional Intent and the Legislative History
of the PLRA
The legislative history of the PLRA has been examined in
several non-class action cases in an attempt to ascertain congres-
sional intent behind the exhaustion requirement. Congress made
clear its intent to quell the "flood" of prison litigation in the
courts. 167 In Booth v Churner,68 the Supreme Court decided that
"' See Doe v Cook County, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 18191, *12 n 5 (N D Ill) (noting that if,
as plaintiffs argued, not all class members qualified as "prisoners" under the PLRA, the
possibility of the doctrine of vicarious exhaustion could be raised); Rahim v Sheahan, 2001
US Dist LEXIS 17214, *23 (N D Ill) (noting that "[t]here are strong analytical analogies
between vicarious waiver of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement and the doctrine of
vicarious exhaustion of administrative remedies which has been recognized in the Title
VII context").
160 1999 US Dist LEXIS 18191 (N D Ill).
161 Id at *12 n 5.
2001 US Dist LEXIS 17214 (N D Ill).
Id at *24.
164 Id.
' Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are those where final injunctive relief with respect to the
class as a whole is sought. See FRCP 23(b)(2).
166 See Hattie v Hallock, 8 F Supp 2d 685, 689 (N D Ohio 1998).
67 See Zehner, 952 F Supp at 1324-25, citing legislative history. On an individual
basis, courts have not had difficulty applying congressional intent (and exploiting the
language in the PLRA) to decide that individuals bringing inmate lawsuits must exhaust
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the PLRA requires procedural exhaustion "regardless of the fit
between a prisoner's prayer for relief and the administrative
remedies possible" based on an evaluation of congressional intent.
In Booth, a state prisoner alleged that prison guards had used
excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment
of the Constitution.6 9 While the grievance system available to
prisoners addressed the alleged complaints, it did not provide for
recovery of money damages.' 70 The Supreme Court reasoned that
Congress mandated a broad exhaustion requirement in enacting
Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA.' 7' Consequently, an inmate seeking
only money damages must first complete a prison administrative
complaint process.1
72
A court has commented that the clear intent of the PLRA, "as
reflected in its title, is to curtail meritless prisoner litigation. 173
In Cooper v Garcia," the court ascertained that "Congress in-
tended to discourage 'frivolous and abusive prison lawsuits' ...
and to prevent convicted criminals from receiving 'preferential
treatment' to that of 'average law-abiding citizens.", 75 Despite
these analyses of legislative history, no court has yet addressed
the issue of Congress's intent regarding § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion
requirement in the class action context.' 6 Although the clear in-
tent of Congress when passing the PLRA was to stem the tide of
frivolous prison lawsuits, '177 requiring class-wide exhaustion for
prisoner lawsuits is not necessarily a means of achieving this
end. The requirement that at least one class member exhaust his
or her administrative remedies should be enough to accomplish
Congress's goal. Rule 23 requires that all class members share a
all available administrative remedies before proceeding to court. See, for example, Perez,
182 F 3d at 534-35. However, application of this intent to quell the increasing flow of
prisoner lawsuits does not clearly translate to the class action context.
'68 532 US 731 (2001).
... Id at 734.
170 Id.
'7 Id at 739.
.7. Booth, 532 US at 734.
,13 Cooper v Garcia, 55 F Supp 2d 1090, 1094 (S D Cal 1999).
17' 55 F Supp 2d 1090 (S D Cal 1999).
175 Id at 1094-95, citing 141 Cong Rec S7525 (May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen Dole).
171 It should be noted that in recent years, Congress has adopted a strategy of passing
increasingly broad and ambiguous legislation that delegates controversial matters to
administrative agencies. In doing this, Congress insulates itself from the political fallout
associated with dealing directly with such issues. See Macey and Miller, 45 Vand L Rev at
666 (cited in note 10).
' Cooper, 55 F Supp 2d at 1094, citing legislative intent.
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common claim.178 If the claim has merit and proceeds through ap-
propriate administrative channels before being litigated, then
having one individual rather than a class of individuals pursuing
that particular claim in an administrative context will not impli-
cate the claim's merits.
IV. RESOLVING THE PLRA ISSUE
Class actions brought under the PLRA present an unsolved
problem. No court has formally considered whether the exhaus-
tion requirement contained in the PLRA extends to all individu-
als in the plaintiff class. This Comment argues that in the class
action context, courts should subject the PLRA's exhaustion re-
quirement to judicial interpretation and discretion in order to
further the purposes of the doctrine. Given the underlying goals
of the exhaustion doctrine and the analogies to both the Social
Security Act and Title VII that may be drawn, courts should favor
waiver of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement in the class action
context.179
A. Purposes of the PLRA
The issue of administrative exhaustion in the prison litiga-
tion context raises several unique concerns. First, unlike -either
the Social Security Act or Title VII, there are no uniform admin-
istrative procedures for inmates. Rather, these procedures vary
from state to state.1" Second, administrative mechanisms are not
necessarily equipped to handle all types of inmate claims.181
When analyzing the PLRA's exhaustion requirement in the
context of class actions, the unique issues presented by prison
administrative exhaustion mechanisms must be recognized.
First, one must address the issue of what constitutes an effective
mechanism for prison administrative remedies. 82 Studies have
identified at least five principles an effective in-prison adminis-
trative mechanism must have: (1) some form of independent re-
... See FRCP 23(a)(2) (mandating that "there are questions of law or fact common to
the class").
179 Id.
"0 William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983
Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv L Rev 610, 643 (1979).
,' Id at 643-45 (noting that cases not concerning conditions of confinement, cases
seeking money damages, and cases seeking to overturn state statutes or regulations are
all examples of claims in-prison administrative mechanisms cannot reach).
"8' Id at 642.
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view by persons outside of the correctional structure; (2) partici-
pation from both line staff and inmates in the design and opera-
tion of the mechanism; (3) short and enforceable time limits; (4)
written responses with reasons for adverse decisions; and (5) ad-
vanced planning, leadership training, orientation, and evaluation
of the mechanism.18
Second, the availability of viable administrative remedies for
inmates is an important concern given the exhaustion require-
ment codified in the PLRA. There are some jurisdictions in which
the absence or inadequacies of an in-prison mechanism compels
prisoner reliance on the courts for dispute resolution.& The ab-
sence of remedies does not seem to imply a problem of equity or
justice under the PLRA; if no mechanism exists for administra-
tive exhaustion of claims, then one assumes that the inmate, or
inmates, would proceed directly to court. However, requiring in-
mates to proceed through useless or inadequate in-prison admin-
istrative mechanisms may be futile and time-consuming.'8S
Third, well-functioning in-prison mechanisms may not be
sufficient for some prisoner claims.8' In-prison mechanisms can-
not reach certain kinds of prisoner complaints, such as those un-
related to actions of prison officials or those where the officials
are powerless to remedy the problems. 8 7 The PLRA seems to rec-
ognize that prison administrative mechanisms are not designed
for suits that might, for example, challenge the inmate's convic-
tion or sentence.1" Thus, the PLRA ought only to apply to inmate
suits challenging conditions of confinement and other claims of a
similar nature. 89
Finally, requiring inmates incarcerated in jails to exhaust
administrative remedies before pursuing litigation presents a
unique problem.'9 Inmates in local jails may not be incarcerated
long enough to permit the exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies. 91 Under these circumstances, the class action mechanism is
Id (deriving principles from work conducted by the Center for Correctional Justice).
Turner, 92 Harv L Rev at 642 (cited in note 183).
' Id.
I Id at 643.
187 Id.
1 See Turner, 92 Harv L Rev at 643 (cited in note 183).
1 Id at 644.
, Id.
181 Id.
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perhaps the sole device which is able to address jail inmate con-
192
cerns.
B. Using Canons of Construction to Interpret the PLRA's
Exhaustion Requirement in the Class Action Context
Congress has become increasingly involved in the rulemak-
ing dialogue, as seen in statutes such as the PLRA, Title VII, and
the Social Security Act, by expressly mandating which persons
may and may not litigate their claims in court.'93 In the class ac-
tion context, such exhaustion requirements and Rule 23 seem to
have potentially competing interests.19
1. Applying the canon disfavoring implied repeal.
In the past, courts have used the canon disfavoring implied
repeal to rectify situations in which a Federal Rule was in tension
or direct conflict with a more recently enacted statute." Given
the increasing tendency of courts to use the canon in order to re-
solve conflicts between federal rules and statutes,1' a court might
evaluate the utilization of the canon disfavoring implied repeal
when determining whether or not the PLRA's exhaustion re-
quirement extends into the class action context.
The first line of inquiry under the canon is to determine
whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between a federal stat-
ute and a federal rule.'9 The canon instructs that it is a "cardinal
principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are
..2 See id ("An exhaustion requirement in these circumstances almost guarantees
mootness. The solution for courts dealing with allegations of serious jail
maladministration is not diversion of individual cases to administrative channels, but
rather a class action under rule 23 ... [A] class action permits the underlying issues to be
resolved despite the release of the named plaintiff and makes systematic relief more
appropriate. It also conserves judicial resources by resolving multiple claims in one
proceeding."). Turner conducted his study at the Harvard Law School Center for Criminal
Justice in the late 1970s-well before the enactment of the PLRA.
' Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A New
Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 51
Emory L J 677, 678 (2002) (discussing Congressional mandates and the resulting court
clashes).
" Compare Morawetz, 71 NYU L Rev at 423-24 (cited in note 56) (listing four basic
purposes of class action) with McKart, 395 US at 193-94 (explaining the purposes of the
administrative exhaustion doctrine).
See Genetin, 51 Emory L J at 701 (cited in note 193).
See id at 703 (referring to frequent lower court reliance on the canon disfavoring
implied repeal).
197 Id.
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disfavored."' ' Courts have created stock exceptions to the canon
disfavoring repeal.1' The most important exception is the "irrec-
oncilable conflict" exception: when two provisions are irreconcil-
able, and a conflict exists, the latter constitutes an implied repeal
of the former, to the extent of the actual conflict." Under this
approach, if the two statutes are capable of co-existing, the courts
must harmonize the statutes.21
2. Potential conflict in rules: Rule 23 and the administrative
exhaustion requirement under the PLRA.
The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is potentially in tension
with Rule 23; however, there does not appear to be an irreconcil-
able conflict between the two rules. Under Rule 23, individuals
with common questions of law or fact may join together as a class
to adjudicate their cause of action.2 The purpose of class actions
includes, among other things, the promotion of efficient and con-
sistent adjudication. 3 If the PLRA exhaustion requirement is
applied to a case in which an individual is pursuing legal action,
Rule 23 is not implicated.' By holding that the PLRA's exhaus-
tion requirement in the class action context calls for only one
member of the class to satisfy the requirement before bringing a
class action lawsuit, a court would be reconciling the purpose of
Rule 23 with Congress's desire to demand that administrative
remedies be exhausted before litigation by inmates is pursued.
3. "Opting out" of the decisional framework provided by the
canons of construction.
Canons of construction provide a useful guide for judges
when deciding cases, but judges can always "opt out" of the deci-
sional framework provided by the canons and decide a particular
case without invoking any canons of construction." As alterna-
tives to using canons, judges can decide cases based on precedent,
"' Radzanower v Touche Ross & Co, 426 US 148, 154 (1976) (quoting United States v
United Continental Tuna Corp, 425 US 164, 168 (1976)).
"9 See Genetin, 51 Emory IJ at 703 (cited in note 193).
Id at 703, 704 n 133 (referencing cases using the "irreconcilable conflict" exception).
'' See Radzanower, 426 US at 155. See also Genetin, 51 Emory L J at 703 (cited in
note 193).
See FRCP 23(a)(2).
See Morawetz, 71 NYU L Rev at 423-24 (cited in note 56).
See, for example, Perez v Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 182 F3d 532, 534-
35 (7th Cir 1999).
Macey and Miller, 45 Vand L Rev at 649 (cited in note 10).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
reasoning by analogy from a similar statute, or on grounds such
as public policy, intrinsic fairness, or economic efficiency.2 It
should be noted that not all of these justifications are equal. 27 For
example, policy justifications may trump other rationales in the
judicial values espoused by the courts.2°8
If judges can ascertain the policy implications of a decision or
use reasoning by analogy from a similar statute, they might favor
such approaches when the utilization of a canon of construction
would produce competing and less desirable results.2°9 It does not
make sense for a court to invoke nonpolicy justifications, such as
canons of construction, when judges are able to determine the
policy implications of a particular decision.10 In the context of the
PLRA, a court is unlikely to reach a competing or less desirable
result by using a statutory construction approach rather than a
public policy approach. Both approaches would likely result in a
judicial determination that the PLRA does not require class-wide
administrative exhaustion.
Courts likely can ascertain the policy implications of requir-
ing class-wide administrative exhaustion, or alternatively, of not
requiring class-wide exhaustion of administrative remedies. Re-
quiring class-wide administrative exhaustion would severely
burden a potential plaintiff class.211 Concerns regarding fairness,
equity, and judicial efficiency would be weighed with competing
interests of administrative autonomy and possibly with congres-
sional intent. Similarly, the reasoning by analogy approach is
readily available to judges in the context of the PLRA. Because
courts can easily utilize the public policy and reasoning by anal-
ogy approaches when addressing the issue of administrative ex-
haustion in class actions under the PLRA, judges will most likely
favor these methods over the utilization of the statutory construc-
tion approach, reserving it for cases in which nonpolicy justifica-
tions are the only available methods of analysis.1 2
Id.
.07 Id at 656.
208 Id.
2 Macey and Miller, 45 Vand L Rev at 656 (cited in note 10).
210 Id.
2" See Morawetz, 71 NYU L Rev at 403, 424 (cited in note 56) (arguing that limiting a
class can deny redress to persons who might have been included and can be a lost
opportunity to reduce litigation costs).
212 Macey and Miller, 45 Vand L Rev at 659 (cited in note 10).
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C. Parallels Between Class Actions Brought Under the Social
Security Act and Title VII
1. Social Security Act class actions.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Social Security
Act's exhaustion requirement for class actions assists in inter-
preting the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. The Supreme Court
held that the Social Security Act provision could not be construed
to limit the class action mechanism.1 3 Similarly, in the interests
of judicial efficiency and protecting the rights of those involved,
the exhaustion requirement under the PLRA should not be inter-
preted as limiting class actions.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that the first prong of the
Social Security Act's "final decision" requirement requires a filing
of a claim with the Secretary.2 4 In the context of the PLRA's ex-
haustion requirement, this would parallel an inmate's filing of a
grievance or undertaking whatever initial administrative action
is dictated by prison or state department of corrections policy.
This parallel between the Social Security Act's exhaustion re-
quirement and the PLRA § 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement
helps address the question of whether individuals who have un-
dertaken, but not completed, the process of exhausting his or her
administrative remedies may join a class. If multiple individuals
have the same complaint or grievance, administrative review of
each and every administrative claim would be time-consuming
and redundant. At the very least, if an inmate has filed an initial
complaint with the proper prison officials or other appropriate
administrative body but has not yet completed the entire process
of the administrative review of the complaint, the inmate should
not necessarily be precluded from joining a class action seeking to
litigate a similar claim. In this scenario, the proper agency au-
thorities are alerted to the complaint prior to litigation and have
already had the opportunity to address the issue through the ap-
propriate administrative channels. If this were the case, Section
1997e(a)'s parallel to the Social Security Act seems to indicate
that an individual with "live" claims would be able to join such a
class under Section 1997e(a). 5
213 See Califano v Yamasaki, 442 US 682, 700 (1979).
2 See Johnson v Sullivan, 922 F2d 346, 352 (7th Cir 1990).
See Marcus v Sullivan, 926 F2d 604, 613 (7th Cir 1991).
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Like the exhaustion requirement for class actions brought
pursuant to the Social Security Act, the Section 1997e(a) exhaus-
tion requirement should be waived by a court in appropriate cir-
cumstances .21 A parallel between the second element of the So-
cial Security Act's exhaustion requirement and Section 1997e(a)
of the PLRA also exists. The exhaustion requirement under the
Social Security Act is nonjurisdictional and may be waived.217
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Wright v Morris,218 held that the
exhaustion requirement under Section 1997e(a) seems not to be
jurisdictional, but rather operates as an affirmative defense.219
Certainly the rationale used by the Seventh Circuit for the
waiver of the exhaustion requirement in Social Security Act class
actions is applicable to PLRA class actions as well.' The pur-
poses of requiring exhaustion under the PLRA are the same as
the rationales underlying the exhaustion requirement in the So-
cial Security Act.2 1 Both exhaustion requirements seek to main-
tain agency autonomy and promote agency efficiency, among
other things.22 Giving effect to these policies and goals of the ex-
haustion requirement is of primary concern. Following the ra-
tionale used by the Seventh Circuit in Marcus,2  waiver of the
exhaustion requirement in PLRA class actions would be appro-
priate.
2. Title VII class actions.
In Jones 'El, the court indicated that PLRA class actions are
analogous to employment discriminations class actions brought
pursuant to Title VII.2 4 Because the exhaustion requirements
under Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA and Title VII are so similar,
the reasoning used in analyzing the Title VII exhaustion re-
quirement can logically be extended to class actions brought pur-
suant to the PLRA. For Title VII cases, courts have found class-
216 Id.
27 Bowen v City of New York, 476 US 467, 483 (1986).
218 111 F3d 414 (6th Cir 1997).
211 Id at 420-21.
220 See Marcus, 926 F2d at 614-15, as an example of the application of the Social
Security Act's exhaustion requirement to a class action case.
221 See, for example, id at 614 (stating the purposes of exhaustion include allowing the
agency to correct its own errors, compiling an adequate record, and affording parties the
benefit of attorney's expertise).
222 See Weinberger v Salft, 422 US 749, 765 (1975).
.2 926 F2d at 614-15.
221 172 F Supp 2d at 1132.
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wide exhaustion senseless, unless the purpose of the doctrine is
fulfilled by such a requirement. 225 Thus, if one class member has
exhausted his or her administrative remedies, other class mem-
bers may not be required to exhaust their administrative reme-
dies in order to be included in the class action.m
Both Title VII and the PLRA involve the adjudication of civil
rights and, therefore, the administrative proceedings and reme-
dies addressing Title VII claims readily available for check by
judicial review227 should apply to the PLRA as well. Waiting for
an entire class of plaintiffs to exhaust their individual adminis-
trative remedies would frustrate the goal of efficient and timely
judicial review. 2 In class actions under the PLRA, as in class
actions under Title VII, it would be wasteful to require individual
exhaustion of administrative remedies for each class member in
the class.' Thus, the far better approach to the application of
Section 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement would follow the Title
VII model so that once an aggrieved person has raised a particu-
lar issue or set of issues through administrative procedure, he
may bring an action on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated pursuant to Rule 23.2 °
CONCLUSION
The consequences of imposing administrative exhaustion re-
quirements on class actions depend on numerous factors. Con-
gress's intent when codifying the doctrine in a particular statute,
the governmental and individual interests involved, and the un-
derlying goals of the exhaustion doctrine, such as administrative
autonomy and judicial efficiency, are all issues courts weigh in
determining whether class-wide administrative exhaustion is re-
quired.
Judicial discretion permeates this area of the law. Courts
have found waiver of exhaustion requirements appropriate under
some circumstances. The Social Security Act's exhaustion re-
See, for example, Foster v Gueory, 655 F2d 1319, 1322 (DC Cir 1981).
Id.
University of Tennessee v Elliott, 478 US 788, 796 (1986) ("Congress did not intend
unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII
claims.").
See Romasanta v United Air Lines, Inc, 717 F2d 1140, 1157 (7th Cir 1983).
See Oatis v Crown Zellerbach Corp, 398 F2d 496, 498 (5th Cir 1968) ("It would be
wasteful, if not vain, for numerous employees, all with the same grievance, to have to
process many identical complaints with the EEOC.").
" Id.
803
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
quirement appears, facially, to limit class actions to classes in
which all individuals have exhausted other administrative reme-
dies; however, courts have held that judicial discretion may be
exercised when policy concerns favor waiver.2' In Title VII class
actions, courts consistently have held that the civil rights of the
class at issue are sufficiently important as to favor expediting
judicial review and thus waiving further exhaustion require-
ments. Similarly, a court addressing Section 1997e(a) of the
PLRA in a class action context will weigh issues such as the
class's rights, concerns of judicial efficiency, and the adequacy of
administrative remedy for individual class members. By employ-
ing this test, courts should exercise judicial discretion to waive
the exhaustion requirement for each class member.
,' See Part II B 2.
.32 See Part II C 2.
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